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ABSTRACT  
Today’s society relies greatly upon an array of complex 
national and international infrastructure networks such as 
transportation, utilities, telecommunication, and even 
financial networks.  While modeling and simulation tools 
have provided insight into the behavior of individual 
infrastructure networks, a far less understood area is that of 
the interrelationships among multiple infrastructure 
networks including the potential cascading effects that may 
result due to these interdependencies. This paper first 
describes infrastructure interdependencies as well as 
presenting a formalization of interdependency types.  Next 
the paper describes a modeling and simulation framework 
called CIMS© and the work that is being conducted at the 
Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to model and simulate 
infrastructure interdependencies and the complex 
behaviors that can result. 
1 INTRODUCTION
In these days of National Security concerns following the 
9/11 attacks and in the wake of the devastation of 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the discussion of the 
protection and restoration of “Critical Infrastructures” has 
risen as a national concern and research area.  The U.S. 
Patriot Act defines critical infrastructure as 
systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, 
so vital to the United States that the incapacity 
or destruction of such systems and assets would 
have a debilitating impact on security, national 
economic security, national public health or 
safety, or any combination of those matters.  
(U.S. Congress 2001) 
The focus of this research, however, is not with 
individual infrastructures, but with the intertwining of 
resources and information demands that exist between 
them.  Advances in information technology (IT) and the 
necessity to improve efficiency have resulted in 
infrastructures that have become increasingly automated 
and interlinked. Most modern commercial infrastructures 
are composed of a collection of interconnected networks 
(both physical and computer based) that serve different 
purposes and have different owners.  Indeed, even parts of 
the information residing on a single sub-network may have 
different purposes and different owners.  Critical 
information and controls are passed between these 
component elements to coordinate necessary functions. 
The complexity and interdependency of these critical 
resource flows introduces nuances and potential 
vulnerabilities into the infrastructure. Natural disasters, 
deliberate attacks or accidental system failures within 
infrastructures may result in cascading effects that are 
neither readily apparent nor immediately understood. 
This paper examines the issues of interdependency 
modeling, simulation and analysis. The remainder of 
section one discusses infrastructures further.  Section two 
examines infrastructure interdependencies and provides 
formalism for these dependencies.  Section three then 
presents a software framework named the Critical 
Infrastructure Modeling System (CIMS©) which is used at 
the Idaho National Laboratory for critical infrastructure 
interdependency analysis. 
1.1 THE INFRASTRUCTURE MODEL 
Infrastructure is defined as the framework of 
interdependent networks and systems comprising 
identifiable industries, institutions, including 
people and procedures, and distribution 
capabilities that provide a reliable flow of 
products and services essential to the defense and 
economic security of the United States, the 
smooth functioning of governments at all levels, 
and society as a whole. (Clinton 1996)
Within the course of this paper and also within the 
simulation environment CIMS©, infrastructures are 
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represented graphically as a network composed of Nodes 
and Edges. Within this context, nodes and edges have 
specific meaning and are defined as such: 
Definition 1 An infrastructure Node is an entity that acts 
as a source, produces, consumes, or transforms a resource.  
By the same token, however, a node may represent social 
or political factors of influence that do not manifest in 
physical form, but which can impact physical 
infrastructure.  
Definition 2 An Edge is a physical or virtual entity that 
acts as a conduit for flow for a physical quantity, 
information or influence.  Therefore, an edge (or arc) 
between two nodes represents a direct level of dependence.
 Infrastructure networks, these collections of nodes and 
edges, represent a dynamic and complex structure. The 
ACIP, a European based consortium devoted to the 
developing a roadmap critical infrastructure protection 
research, provides the following examples illustrating these 
dynamics:  
x Growing Size: An increasing number of nodes 
and links between nodes with increasing structural 
complexity. 
x Network Evolution: The link between nodes could 
change over time.  
x Connection diversity: the links between nodes 
could have different weights, directions and signs. 
x Dynamical Complexity: Nodes themselves could 
be non-linear dynamical systems in which the 
state of each node may vary in complicated ways.  
In a network, the state of each node can vary in 
time in complicated ways.  
x Node Diversity: A network may be composed of 
many different types of nodes. There could be 
many different kinds of nodes. Power generation 
stations in the Power Grid may be of very 
different nature. 
x Interaction between factors: All of the above 
factors can interact to affect network dynamics. 
Here nodal dynamics affect connection weights. 
(Schmitz and Neubecker 2003) 
These networks are inherently difficult to comprehend 
as a single entity.  Coupled with primary and n-ary 
interdependencies, the resulting emergent behavior 
presents an even greater challenge in understanding. 
This collection of infrastructure networks and their 
associated interdependencies compose a highly nonlinear 
and complex system.  A complex system being defined as:  
one whose component parts interact with 
sufficient intricacy that they cannot be predicted 
by standard linear equations; so many variables 
are at work in the system that its overall behavior 
can only be understood as an emergent 
consequence of the holistic sum of all the myriad 
behaviors embedded within.  (Levy 1992) 
As such, the study of infrastructure 
interdependencies and the influence between 
networks represents a very challenging and relative 
immature area of research. (Dunn and Wigert 2004)  
2 INFRASTRUCTURE INTERDEPENDENCY 
ANALYSIS 
What are infrastructure interdependencies and how are they 
modeled? To answer this question, Figure 1 illustrates a 
common representation of infrastructure interdependencies 
and the scenario of a flooding event and the subsequent 
response. Parallels to this scenario can easily be drawn 
from the events in New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina. 
Within the figure individual infrastructure networks are 
represented on a single plane. The parallel lines represent 
individual sectors within that particular infrastructure. The 
spheres or nodes represent key infrastructure components 
within that sector. For example, the energy infrastructure 
contains the sectors of electrical generation and 
distribution, natural gas production and distribution, etc. 
Ties and dependencies exist within each infrastructure 
between the different sectors. In the figure, the solid lines 
crossing sectors and connecting nodes represent internal 
dependencies. Additionally, however, dependencies exist 
between different infrastructures. The dashed lines 
represent the infrastructure interdependencies. 
The example in the figure is a simple attempt to relate 
the complexity of dependencies that may exist between 
components. In chaotic environments such as emergency 
response to catastrophic events, decision makers should 
understand the dynamics underlying the infrastructures. 
Figure 1: Infrastructure Interdependencies 
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Failure to understand these dynamics will result in 
ineffective response and poor coordination between 
decision makers and agencies responsible for rescue, 
recovery, and restoration. This could include 
mismanagement of resource distribution including 
supplies, rescue personnel, and security teams. The result 
is the loss of public faith, and worse, the needless loss of 
life.
2.1 Types of Interdependencies 
Infrastructure interdependencies refer to relationships or 
influences that an element in one infrastructure imparts 
upon another infrastructure.  
Interdependencies can be of different types.  Rinaldi, 
Peerenboom, and Kelly (2003) describe dependencies in 
terms of four general categories:    
x Physical – a physical reliance on material flow 
from one infrastructure to another; 
x Cyber – a reliance on information transfer 
between infrastructure; 
x Geographic – a local environmental event affects 
components across multiple infrastructure due to 
physical proximity; and 
x Logical – a dependency that exists between 
infrastructures that does not fall into one of the 
about categories. 
Dudenhoeffer, Permann and Boring (2006) proposed a 
slightly different but similar categorization of: 
x Physical –direct linkage between infrastructures 
as from a supply/consumption/production 
relationship;  
x Geospatial – co-location of infrastructure 
components within the same footprint;  
x Policy – a binding of infrastructure components 
due to policy or high level decisions; and 
x Informational – a binding or reliance on 
information flow between infrastructures. 
The study of inter-dependency is not unique to 
infrastructure analysis.  One parallel effort is that of Bühne 
et alt (2003) in his discussion of dependencies in feature 
modeling for use cases. Here he defines the following 
dependencies: 
x Requires-dependency – a binding of one object 
implies the need of another object, i.e. a required 
following;  
x Exclusive-dependency – describes that the binding of 
one object excludes the selection of another object; 
x Hints-dependency – describes dependencies where the 
binding of one object has some positive influence on 
another object; 
x Hinders-dependency – describes that the binding of 
one object has some negative influence on another 
object.
2.1.1 Interdependency Formalization 
Building upon the preceding definitions, the following 
section defines a set of infrastructure interdependent 
relations while adding mathematical formalism.   
Definition 3 An infrastructure network, I, is a set of nodes 
related to each other by common function. The network 
may be connected or disjoint.  It may be directional, 
unidirectional or have elements of both. Internal 
relationships/dependencies within the infrastructure I are 
represented by edge (a, b) with a, b  I. 
Definition 4  Given Ii and Ij are infrastructure networks, i 
z j, a  Ii and b  Ij, an interdependency is defined as a 
relationship between infrastructures and represented as 
the edge (a,b) which implies that node b is dependent upon 
node a.  Depending on the nature or type of the 
relationship, this relationship may be reflexive in that (a,b) 
ĺ (b,a).  
Therefore, let infrastructure I be denote by the set of 
nodes and edges within the network, or I = { Ni, Ei1, Ei2}
where Ni is the set of nodes consisting of the network I, Ei1
consists of the set of internal dependencies within network 
I, Ei1 = {(a,b) s.t. a, b  I},  and Ei2 which consists of the 
set of interdependencies extending from infrastructure I,
Ei2 = {(a,b) s.t. a  I, b  K} for some infrastructure K  I.
The types of interdependent relationships include 
physical, informational, geospatial, policy/procedural, and 
societal interdependencies as defined below. 
Definition 5 Physical Interdependency:  (a,b)e    This 
defines a requirement, often engineering reliance of b on a.  
In other words, a loss of asset a results in a loss of asset b,   
~ a ĺ ~b. 
A simple example of this type of relationship is 
illustrated when a tree falls on a power line during a 
thunderstorm resulting in a loss of power to an office 
building and all the computers inside.  Note, this effect is 
not driven by a single event, but is driven by the 
continuous state of a; i.e. b will not be restored until a is 
restored, bĺ a.
Definition 6 Informational Interdependency: (a,b)i    This 
defines an informational or control requirement between a 
and b.  Information from asset a, while not necessary for 
the existence of node b, is essential for certain functionality 
in node b, ~ a ĺ ~f(b) where f(b) is a function of operation 
for asset b.   
A supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) 
systems which monitors and controls elements on the 
electrical power grid is an example of this type of 
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relationship between the SCADA system and the power 
grid.  While a loss of the SCADA system will not by itself 
shut down the grid, the ability to remotely monitor and 
operation breakers is lost.  Likewise, this relationship may 
represent a piece of information or intelligence flowing 
from node a that supports a decision process in b. An 
example is the dispatch of emergency services.  While the 
responders may be fully capable of responding, an 
informational requirement exists as to answering where, 
what, and when to initiate response.  
Definition 7 Geospatial Interdependency: (a,b)g  While not 
necessarily represented as an edge in the network, this 
defines a relationship that exist entirely due to the 
proximity of nodes a to b.  In other words (a,b)g ĺ d(a,b) 
< İ  for some predefined distance İ.  Thus E(a) ĺ E(b) 
where E(a) represents a physical event occurring at the 
location of node a.   
Examples include flooding or fire affecting all the 
assets located in one building or area. This relation is 
reflexive, (a,b)gĺ (b,a)g.
Definition 8 Policy/Procedural Interdependency: (a,b)p
This refers to an interdependency that exists due to policy 
or procedures relating an event or state change for node a 
to a subsequent effect on node b or Ej(a) ĺ Ek(b).  An 
interesting aspect of this type of relationship is that it may 
not exist prior to the event Ej(a), in other words, Ej(a) may 
drive the creation of the relation (a,b)p.   
Note that the impact of this event may still exist given 
the recovery of asset a from Ej(a).  An example occurred 
with the bombing of the World Trade Towers. Upon the 
bombing of the towers with aircraft, “all U.S. air 
transportation was halted for more than 24 hours, and 
commercial flights did not resume for three to four days.”  
(DOE 2001) 
Definition 9 Societal Interdependency: (a,b)s  Similar in 
form to Policy/Procedural interdependence, this refers to 
interdependencies or influences than an event on an 
infrastructure component may impart on societal factors 
such as public opinion, public confidence, fear and 
cultural issues.  Although no physical linkage or
relationship may exist, consequence from event in one 
infrastructure sector may impact other infrastructures.  
Likewise, this influence may be time sensitive in nature, 
decaying as the time from the original event grows.   So for 
(a,b)s, Ej(a) ĺ Ek(b,t) which represents a decaying effect 
over time t.
An example of this type of relationship is the impact 
of the 9/11 Attacks.  After the restoration of air service 
following the attack, air traffic was significantly reduced as 
the public evaluated the safety of travel.  The impact of this 
was significant resulting in layoffs in the airline industry 
and numerous bankruptcy filings by some of the smaller 
airlines. (DOE 2001)  
 While the dependencies within an individual 
infrastructure network are often well understood, the 
region of interest in this paper is the influence or impact 
that one infrastructure can impart upon another.  These 
cross infrastructure effects continue to grow as information 
technology pushes interconnectivity between all aspects of 
business.  Therefore, the key effects to model and gain 
understanding of are the chains of influence that cross 
multiple sectors and induce potentially unforeseen n-ary 
effects.  These chains, potentially composed of multiple 
interdependency types, compose the path {(a,b), (b,c), 
(c,d), ...(y,z)} representing the cascading consequence of an 
event or the derived dependency of node z on node a,
denoted (aDz).  Likewise the genesis of the chain may not 
be singular in that the end effect is the influence of 
multiple nodes, denoted by (abc..Dz).
These paths may not be unique in terms of effect, they 
may change over time, and their behavior may be 
cumulative in nature, i.e. the end effect may the 
culmination of multiple predicated events.  The 
intertwining of networks in this fashion represents a 
complex system where emergent behaviors are rarely fully 
understood.  
2.2 Problem Space 
In the analysis of infrastructure interdependencies and the 
subsequent emergent system behaviors, three major 
problem areas exist, namely:   
1. Given a set of initiating events {E(a), E(b), …}
what is the cascading impact on a subset of nodes 
{x, y, z , …}.
2. Given a set of nodes {x, y, z,…} and a desired end 
state, what is a set of events {E(a), E(b), …} that 
would cause this effect.
3. Given a set of events {E(a), E(b), …} and a set of 
observed outcomes of on nodes {x, y, z,….}, is it 
possible to determine the derived interdependence 
(abDxyz).
These scenarios are illustrated in Figure 2.   Clouded or 
incomplete knowledge of the infrastructure may 
complicate this issue.  Thus the infrastructure mapping 
must rely on inferred influence patterns and bits and pieces 
of intelligence.  This is most certainly true in terms of the 
aftermath of a storms such as Katrina or Rita, or when 
dealing with infrastructures outside of one’s control.   
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3 CIMS MODELING AND SIMULATION 
FRAMEWORK 
3.1 System Overview 
CIMS© was developed to examine the interrelationships 
between infrastructure networks and more specifically, the 
emergent systems behaviors that develop when one or 
more nodes within the system are perturbed.  CIMS© and 
its ongoing development is sponsored by the National 
Security Division at the INL in its ongoing mission for 
providing Critical Infrastructure Protection and 
Preparedness.  This work directly supports the following 
Presidential Directives: Presidential Decision Direction 63 
(May 1998) and Presidential Executive Order 13231: 
Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Information Age 
(October 16, 2001). 
While many well defined models and simulations exist 
for infrastructure sectors such as electrical power grid 
models, traffic flow, rail systems, computer networks, etc., 
very few models exist that seek to tie these infrastructures 
together in a form representative of their actual 
implementation.  Additionally, many of these models 
present a physics/engineering-based approach and are very 
good at individual sector analysis, but they do not 
necessarily support high level command and control.   
CIMS© takes a command-level approach seeking to 
provide decision makers with sufficient information in 
terms of mission capability without digging into the 
engineering level.  For example, often it is enough for a 
decision maker to understand that electrical power is on or 
off via the amperage going into a facility.  In this way, 
CIMS© models and simulates infrastructures and the 
interdependencies that exist between them at the level 
appropriate to the situation.  
3.2 System Architecture 
  The CIMS© architecture uses an agent-based approach 
(ABM) (Rocha 1999) to model infrastructure elements, the 
relations between elements, and individual component 
behavior.  The key characteristic of the agent and the 
simulations is that each agent exists as an individual entity 
which maintains a state, senses input, and possesses rules 
of behavior that act upon the inputs and either modify the 
state or produce an output.    
Each network within the simulation is modeled as a 
connected graph, G = (N, E), where N represents the nodes 
within the network and E represents the edges between the 
nodes.  Edges also represent the relationship, i.e. 
interdependencies, between infrastructures.  Nodes and 
edges may be deterministic in behavior or they may have 
stochastic properties.    
The nodes and edges of the infrastructure network are 
displayed in a 3D visualization as spheres and lines, 
respectively, or as predefined shapes. Colors can be 
associated with the state of the infrastructure elements or 
any other characteristic. Different infrastructures may be 
separated vertically in order to visually see the 
interconnections between them; likewise, infrastructure 
sectors may be further broken out. Visualization is further 
enhanced by the ability to incorporate potentially complex 
3D objects. The model can be built upon an underlying 
bitmap, satellite photo, map, or chart. Nodes and edges are 
geo-referenced by latitude, longitude, and altitude or any 
other 3-dimensional coordinates. This structure permits the 
information to be quickly added to the model without the 
requirements of a geographic information system (GIS) 
database. Figure 3 illustrates multiple views of a CIMS©
model of a facility and multiple infrastructure sectors. This 
particular model shows the consequence of the inadvertent 
tripping of a breaker to an electrical substation and the 
domino effect that occurs to the interlinked structures.  
CIMS© is a discrete event simulation and not 
representative of real time.  The visualization is sequenced 
and updated as the simulation runs, to reveal the emergent 
or cascading system behaviors that develop as a result of 
the interdependencies between nodes. This makes the 
interrelationships between infrastructure networks and 
their consequences easy to quickly evaluate, facilitating the 
decision-making process. The goal of this simulation is not 
to produce an “exact” outcome, but to illustrate possible 
outcomes to enlighten the decision process. 
The second and third views in Figure 3 show the side 
views of the facility illustrating the relationship between 
infrastructures. The vertical lines indicate the different 
infrastructure sectors and the horizontal lines indicate a 
dependency between the infrastructures. The buildings can 
represent the physical entity or the capability associated 
with that building, such as a production process.  
Figure 2: Interdependency Analysis Problem Space 
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Scenarios can be enacted through two different 
methods.  First, to manipulate individual nodes or edges 
during “what if” analyses, the user can select specific 
nodes and edges and modify their state directly, removing 
or restoring capacity and watching the effect migrate 
through the system.  Second, the user can develop baseline 
scripts tying together multiple events and observing the 
behavior.  This can also be conducted in conjunction with 
individual node manipulation.  
Analysis is primarily visual in that consequence and 
cascading events are visually presented to the user. Less 
mature at this time are state reports and a running history 
report illustrating initiating events and cascading effects.  
3.3 System Functionality   
Developed with a war gaming approach to modeling and 
simulation, CIMS© possesses the following functionality:  
x Ability to model and visualize interdependencies; 
x Ability to quickly construct infrastructure models 
using map images, satellite photos, and other 
electronic images; 
x Ability to drill down and extract/change 
properties of individual infrastructure elements; 
x Ability to tie node behavior directly to live sensor 
input; 
Loss of one of the 
main breakers at an 
electrical distribution 
substation, resulting in 
a loss of power to half 
the facility. 
CIMS© Side view illustrating the 3D structures and the 
separate infrastructures.
Side view showing the separate 
infrastructures and dependencies. 
Physical
Dependency
Figure 3: Infrastructure Components Surrounding a Facility. 
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x Ability to link active information to simulated 
entities (i.e. web page links, text documents, video 
streams, and custom programs); 
x Graphical (3D) representation of key 
infrastructure elements and the associated 
relationships; 
x Ability to visualize bomb blast zones, flooding, 
and other areas of impact; 
x Ability to model moving entities such as planes, 
traffic, people, etc.; 
x Lightweight: program size (less than 10 
Megabytes); and 
x Mobile: works on multiple platforms, including 
Windows, UNIX, and Linux. 
CIMS© has been applied to evaluate infrastructure at 
the INL and has been used as a validation tool with other 
infrastructure interdependency modeling projects for the 
DOE.  Currently, CIMS© is being evaluated by the 
Louisiana Recovery Authority for applications in 
Hurricane Katrina and Rita recovery and restoration 
activities.  
3.4 Interdependency Evaluation and Analysis 
CIMS© provides a highly visual and interactive 
environment for observing the cascading effects and 
consequence of infrastructure perturbations.  Through this 
visualization, a greater understanding of the emergent 
behaviors is achieved.  The utilization of visualization by 
itself is complete, however, given the size and complexity 
of the networks additional search and analysis methods are 
required to identify event–effect relationships especially 
across multiple infrastructures.  Therefore the INL and 
University of Idaho are using artificial intelligence (AI) 
techniques to help refine the search space and identify 
subsets of possible interactions.  This phase of research is 
just commencing and a brief description follows. 
3.4.1 Application of Genetic Algorithms  
Although CIMS© provides the ability for a user to generate 
multiple “What if?” scenarios, an automated process would 
be more efficient in generating multiple scenarios for 
determining the optimal infrastructure assets to protect 
from attack or restore in a disaster situation based on a 
predetermined set of critical infrastructure assets.  This set 
of infrastructure assets which includes the critical assets 
and the assets they rely upon for protection and restoration 
is referred to as the critical sub-network.  The “irreducible 
critical sub-network” is the minimum network that 
contains the mission essential assets, i.e. not all parts of an 
infrastructure are equally critical.  Identifying, protecting, 
and restoring the critical sub-network is an important 
unsolved problem especially when confronted with the 
complexities of interdependence and subsequent emergent 
behavior. (Dudenhoeffer et alt 2002). 
A genetic algorithm (GA) is being developed for 
integration with CIMS© to determine the optimal 
infrastructure assets to protect from attack or restore in a 
disaster situation.  This will define the critical sub-network 
for the infrastructure of concern given information such as: 
x List of critical assets; 
x Relative importance of each infrastructure asset; 
x Cost to destroy the individual assets; 
x Cost to repair the individual assets; 
x Time to destroy the individual assets; and 
x Time to repair the individual assets. 
The GA will use this information to evaluate the resilience 
of infrastructure configurations using methods such as 
disabling arbitrary assets and letting the infrastructure 
stabilize through the CIMS© simulation.  This can help 
determine the optimum (or ranking) of assets to restore or 
protect from attack or other disaster. 
The goal of this research is to accomplish one or more of 
the following: 
1. Find the critical sub-network(s). 
2. Find ways to mediate damages (which nodes can 
be protected before attack/accident/natural 
disaster, or which nodes should be restored first 
after the event). 
3. Identify weaknesses in the network. 
4. Accomplish above tasks on a dynamic network in 
the midst of asset loss.  
4 CONCLUSIONS 
Critical Infrastructure Protection preparedness and 
recovery is a complex and challenging task.  The 
complexity of infrastructure interdependencies compounds 
the enormous effort of coordinating relief and 
reconstruction efforts.  This paper has presented a 
formalization of to categorize infrastructure 
interdependencies.  The purpose in this formalization 
attempt is to create a common language for discussion, 
algorithmic development, and analysis.  Next the 
interdependency modeling framework CIMS© was 
introduced as a tool for infrastructure analysis supporting 
the ability to conduct “what if” scenario analysis.  Finally, 
acknowledging some of the limitations of CIMS©, we 
introduce research in the application of genetic algorithms 
to assist in the identification of the critical sub-network.    
In conclusion, the area of interdependency modeling is 
a very challenging research area.  Network diversity and an 
ever-changing environment dictate the development of 
multiple tools in modeling and simulation to assist in all 
aspects of analysis including preparation, response, 
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recovery and restoration. United States will undoubtedly be 
faced with catastrophic events brought on by nature or 
through malicious act.  It is key that the leaderships in 
charge of response, recovery and reconstruction operations 
has decision tools available to assist in dealing with the 
complexity of the infrastructure.  
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